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Although loan quality in the U.S. banking industry deteriorated in recent years, a comparison
with the banking crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s suggests that the industry is in a far
better position today than it was a decade ago. The percentage of troubled loans is lower, loan
quality problems are confined principally to large-bank commercial and industrial lending, 
and credit weakness is concentrated in a small number of borrower industries.
T
he 1990s was a period of considerable success
for the U.S.banking industry.As the economy
surged, bank profits rose and the volume of
problem loans declined.More recently,however,the 2001-02
recession,1 industry-specific excesses, and international
exposures have weakened bank balance sheets and led to an
increase in the ratio of nonperforming loans to total loans
(NPL ratio).2
This edition of Current Issues examines the decline in
loan quality in the U.S.banking industry that took place
from fourth-quarter 1999 to third-quarter 2002 and 
discusses its potential implications for the industry and
the economy as a whole.We begin with a comparison to the
banking crisis of the late 1980s and early 1990s and show
that the recent increase in nonperforming loans is 
relatively modest.While this largely reflects the immense
scale ofthe banking problems ofthe early 1990s,the quality
of loans for the U.S. banking industry is clearly much 
better now than a decade ago.
Aggregate ratios, however, hide important variation
across banks and loan types,so we also examine the per-
formance of specific lending segments.We show that the
recent increase in the NPL ratio stems almost entirely 
from the lending activity of large banks,particularly their
commercial and industrial (C&I) lending. In contrast,
problem loans were more widespread across C&I and real
estate lending for banks of all sizes in the early 1990s.
To shed light on the source of loan quality problems,we
employ data from the 2002 Shared National Credit (SNC)
Program to examine the performance of commercial loans
in different borrower industries.3We find that loan quality
problems in 2002 were concentrated more heavily in 
particular industries than they were in the early 1990s,
suggesting that industry-specific problems and not broad
macroeconomic trends were driving the recent run-up in
nonperforming loans.The highest ratio of nonperforming
loan commitments in 2002,for example,was found in the
broadcast and telecommunications industry, which
accounted for nearly one-quarter of the aggregate ratio.
We conclude that many factors make the recent deterio-
ration in loan quality less of a threat to both the banking
industry and the U.S.economy than the problems a decade
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considerably smaller. Second, the industry is healthier,
with a larger stock of loan-loss reserves and equity capital
providing a buffer against future charge-offs.Third,the con-
centration of the problems in particular sectors reduces 
the risk of an economy-wide “credit crunch” and should
allow bankers and supervisors to focus their attention on 
the troubled industries. Finally, the relatively strong loan
quality shown by small and midsized banks limits the risk of
a credit crunch for smaller firms,which are more likely than
large firms to depend on loans from these banks.
Comparing Loan Quality across Economic Slowdowns
To get a better sense of the magnitude of the recent deterio-
ration in aggregate loan quality,we compare loan perfor-
mance during the slowdown of the past few years with that
during the slowdown of the early 1990s.Specifically,using
data from the Consolidated Reports of Condition and
Income (“Call Reports”) for all U.S.commercial banks,we
compare the loan quality deterioration from fourth-quarter
1999 to third-quarter 2002 with the decline that occurred
from fourth-quarter 1988 to second-quarter 1991.4 We
choose these two periods because each runs from the lowest
level of the NPL ratio to the highest level for that recession.
A comparison of movements in the NPL ratio over the two
periods shows that both the level and the increase in loan
quality problems were smaller during the recent slowdown
(Chart 1).Moreover,other calculations indicate that the U.S.
banking industry was in much better financial condition
heading into the recent recession than in the early 1990s:
banks had higher profits,capital,and loan-loss reserves.This
improvement owes much to the strength of the economy and
the regulatory focus on capital adequacy during the 1990s,
but it also reflects the increased securitization that shifted
some risk outside of banking and the absence of adverse
shocks like those that hit the banking industry in the 1980s.5
While aggregate analysis provides a useful view of overall
loan performance, it misses important differences across
firms and business lines.These differences reflect key fac-
tors such as business practices,management ability,scale,
and technology,as well as exposure to different economic
and regional shocks.6The remainder of this section examines
loan quality problems across bank size classes and loan types.
Decomposing the Level of Loan Quality
Any aggregate ratio can be rewritten as a weighted average of
the ratio for subsets of institutions or types of loans. For
example,the aggregate NPL ratio equals the weighted aver-
age of the NPL ratio across banks or loan types using loan
shares as weights.Each share-weighted NPL ratio is called
the “contribution to the level of the NPL ratio”and shows
how important that set of loans is to the aggregate ratio.7
By calculating the contribution that each of the major
types of loans—consumer,real estate,and commercial and
industrial—has made to the level of the NPL ratio,we shed
light on the sources of the aggregate loan quality decline
during the 1990-91 and 2001-02 recessions (Chart 2).8 Real
estate lending emerges as the primary source of the decline
in the early 1990s,while C&I lending has largely driven the
more recent decline.An alternative decomposition of the
NPL ratio by bank size—large,medium,and small—shows
that recent loan quality problems derive almost entirely from
the large banks,while medium and small banks also made
substantial contributions in the early 1990s (Chart 3).9 The
decompositions are revealing in other ways: They show that
C&I loans at large banks were already a problem before the
1990-91 recession,while the recent run-up in C&I nonper-
forming loans seems more cyclical.Finally,in addition to a
higher aggregate NPL ratio in the early 1990s,the underlying
data (not shown) indicate that loan quality was worse for
most types of lending and size classes,which highlights the
breadth of the earlier problems.
These differences reflect the divergent nature of the two
economic slowdowns: The recession in the early 1990s was
exacerbated by the developing-country debt crisis and over-
built commercial real estate,10 while the recent downturn
was linked to the high-tech bust and large declines in busi-
ness investment.For example,the NPL ratio for commercial
real estate loans was 8.7 percent in the second quarter of
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Source: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Consolidated Reports 
of Condition and Income.
Notes: The nonperforming loan ratio is defined as aggregate nonperforming loans 
as a percentage of total loans. Shaded areas indicate periods designated recessions 
by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
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1991,more than double that of the portfolio as a whole; in
the third quarter of 2002,C&I lending had the highest NPL
ratio of 2.3 percent while the commercial real estate NPL
ratio was only 0.9 percent.
The fact that large banks have consistently driven the
aggregate NPL ratio over the past two decades is not sur-
prising, given that they dominate U.S. banking, but it is 
interesting to note that they typically have higher NPL ratios
than their smaller competitors.11 Moreover,the divergence
in loan quality between large and other banks has increased
in each of the last two recessions,with small banks experi-
encing almost no increase in their NPL ratios.One possible 
explanation is that economy-wide recessions are not good
indicators of the relevant shocks for small banks, which
might be more affected by fluctuations in local lending 
markets.Alternatively,the generally worse loan quality of
large banks could simply reflect more risk taking.Because
large banks can diversify their portfolio more easily than
small banks,they might accept riskier borrowers,price the
risk accordingly,and accept the higher (but predictable) loan
quality problems.Demsetz and Strahan (1997),for example,
argue that diversification allows large banks to operate with
higher leverage and hold riskier loans.Finally,large banks
typically hold more unsecured debt than smaller ones and
Sources: Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income; authors’ calculations.
Notes: The contribution of each loan type to the aggregate nonperforming loan (NPL) ratio equals the share-weighted NPL ratio of that loan type. Foreign office loans are 
broken out only for first-quarter 1984 to fourth-quarter 1986; after that period, they are classified by loan type. Shaded areas indicate periods designated recessions 
by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
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Large banksare therefore obliged to place a greater portion of their 
deteriorating loans in nonperforming status earlier.
Decomposing Changes in Loan Quality
We now examine the sources of the changes in the industry
NPL from fourth-quarter 1988 to second-quarter 1991 and
from fourth-quarter 1999 to third-quarter 2002.We distin-
guish changes in loan quality within banks or lending lines
from reallocations between banks or lending lines by 
calculating a “within effect”and a “reallocation effect.”The 
intuition is that the aggregate NPL ratio rises if either par-
ticular banks or loan segments show rising NPL ratios (the
within effect) or if banks with relatively high NPL ratios
increase market share (the reallocation effect).12 Isolating
these two effects clarifies the forces behind the rising loan
quality problems in each period.
Our estimates suggest that deteriorating loan quality
withinindividual institutions was the dominant force in both
periods (see table,top panel).Focusing on the within effects,
we break out our results by bank size and loan type (bottom
panel).In 1999-2002,large banks were responsible for virtu-
ally all of the rise in the NPL ratio, while medium banks
made a sizable contribution in the earlier period.Certainly,
the importance of large banks in recent years was partly due
to their growing market share, but that is not the whole
explanation.During this period,the decline in loan quality
was deeper and more rapid for large banks than for small.
Across types of loans,the story is also very different for
the two periods.In the recent slowdown,C&I lending at large
and medium banks was the primary source of the increase
in the NPL ratio,while real estate lending made virtually no
contribution.For the 1988-91 period,the picture is reversed:
real estate lending dominated C&I lending.13 For the large
banks,the contribution of domestic C&I loans is comparable
across the two periods,although foreign C&I loans were a
much greater drag recently.The more modest contribution of
foreign loans to the change in the NPL ratio over the earlier
period reflects the fact that foreign banking problems asso-
ciated with developing-country loans peaked in the late
1980s;the period from fourth-quarter 1988 to second-quarter
1991 actually represents an improvement in this area.
Loan Quality by Borrower for Large Banks
To determine whether the C&I loan problems at large banks
originate with a particular group of borrowers,we use data
from the Shared National Credit Program.The SNC Program
provides information on borrower industry as part of its
annual review of large syndicated loan commitments.14
We aggregate the loan-level SNC data by borrower industry
using the major industry groupings—those identified by two
digits—in the North American Industry Classification System,
or NAICS (OMB 1998).To isolate the high-tech industries,
we then break out broadcasting and telecommunications
(NAICS 513) and computers and electrical equipment
(NAICS 334 and 335) from their larger industry groupings.
These steps yield a total of twenty-two borrower industries.
Our next step is to evaluate the credit quality of each of the
twenty-two industries by calculating its nonperforming loan
commitment (NPLC) ratio.We define nonperforming loan
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Decomposition of Nonperforming Loan Growth
during Periods of Loan Quality Deterioration
Percentage Points
1988:4 to 1991:2 1999:4 to 2002:3
Aggregate Decomposition
Change in NPL ratio 1.08 0.56
Total “within effect” 0.95 0.66
Large banks 0.48 0.57
Medium banks 0.45 0.06
Small banks 0.02 0.03
Total “reallocation effect” 0.13 -0.10
Share effect -0.10 0.00
Covariance effect 0.23 -0.10
Decomposition of“Within Effect”
by Bank Size 
Large bank “within effect” 0.48 0.57
Commercial and industrial—domestic 0.38 0.37
Commercial and industrial—foreign -0.17 0.11
Consumer 0.03 -0.01
Total real estate 0.56 0.02
Other -0.33 0.07
Medium bank “within effect” 0.45 0.06
Commercial and industrial—domestic 0.18 0.04
Commercial and industrial—foreign 0.00 0.00
Consumer 0.02 0.00
Total real estate 0.26 0.02
Other -0.01 0.00
Small bank “within effect” 0.02 0.03
Commercial and industrial plus other 0.00 0.01
Consumer 0.00 0.00
Total real estate 0.01 0.02
Source:Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council,Consolidated Reports 
of Condition and Income.
Notes:A technical appendix to this article,available at <http://www.newyorkfed.org/
rmaghome/curr_iss/ci9-4.html>,explains how the decomposition framework is
derived.The periods in the table cover the change from the lowest level of the
aggregate nonperforming loan (NPL) ratio to the highest level.The NPL ratio is
defined as nonaccrual loans plus loans ninety days past due as a percentage of
loans for each type and total.Small banks have assets less than $500 million;
medium banks,assets between $500 million and $10 billion;and large banks,
assets greater than $10 billion (all values are in constant 2002 dollars).www.newyorkfed.org/rmaghome/curr_iss 5
commitments to include commitments that are rated
“doubtful”or “loss,”as well as 10 percent of those rated “sub-
standard.”The NPLC ratio is computed as nonperforming
loan commitments divided by total commitments,including
both advanced and undrawn commitments.15
To highlight industries that have undergone a decline 
in credit quality,we plot the 2002 NPLC ratio of each indus-
try against its 1991 ratio (Chart 4). Industries above the 
45-degree line experienced an increase in their NPLC ratio,
while industries below the line experienced a decrease.Each
industry is represented as a circle whose size corresponds to
that industry’s average loan commitment share across the
two periods.Movements in the individual industry ratios
can be compared with the change in the aggregate NPLC
ratio,which fell from 2.6 percent in 1991 to 2.1 percent in
2002,and with the change in the median NPLC ratio,which
fell from 2.0 percent to 1.4 percent.
Although the majority of borrower industries show better
credit quality in 2002 than in 1991, some industries saw
their credit problems worsen.Most notably,the broadcasting
and telecommunications industry accounts for almost one-
quarter of the aggregate NPLC ratio in 2002.Its NPLC ratio
for that year is 7.7 percent,which is sharply higher than its
1991 ratio of 1.8 percent and nearly four times the 2.1 percent
aggregate ratio in 2002.Other industries with high current
ratios and large increases since 1991 are administration and
support,transportation,and utilities.In 1991,by contrast,
the industry with the lowest credit quality was construction.
With an NPLC ratio of 8.7 percent,this industry accounted
for nearly one-quarter of the aggregate ratio. Other weak
performers in 1991 included retail trade and accommoda-
tion.This comparison points to a substantial shift away from
real-estate-related industries as the source of borrower
credit problems.
To complete our analysis,we examine the degree to which
loan quality problems are concentrated in specific borrower
industries.The distribution of the problems can give some
insight into the sources of the decline in credit quality and
has implications for the availability of credit.Credit weak-
nesses that are highly concentrated in particular industries
are more likely to reflect industry-specific problems such as
excess capacity or negative supply shocks, while macro-
economic conditions are more likely to be the culprit if all
industries show weakness. This difference is important
because it is less likely for industry-specific problems to lead
to an overall restriction of credit if bankers can identify the
problem areas and reallocate credit accordingly.
We first compare each industry’s NPLC ratio with the 
economy-wide NPLC ratio.In 2002,only seven ofthe twenty-
two industries posted NPL ratios above the aggregate,
while eleven of the twenty-two were above the aggregate 
in 1991—a finding that suggests greater concentration
today. Using the industry contribution in 1991 and 2002,
we then calculate a variant of the Hirschman-Herfindahl
Index (HHI),a tool used to measure concentration,to evalu-
ate the concentration of loan quality problems. The HHI
across three-digit NAICS industries was higher in 2002—
further evidence that loan quality problems are more 
concentrated today.16
The difficulties in telecommunications deserve some 
discussion because of the large concentration of loan quality
problems in this sector. The Telecommunications Act of
1996 fostered increased competition between local and
national companies,which—reinforced by lofty predictions
of rapidly increasing Internet traffic—led telecom firms 
to invest heavily and borrow extensively from commer-
cial banks and the bond market.Standard and Poor’s,for
example,estimated that U.S.banks have made $60 billion in
loans to telecom firms in the past few years (Mandaro 2002).
Bank lending to the industry has proved to be a problem:
telecommunications defaults have been rising steadily 
since 1999 as firms struggle to finance their heavy debt 
burdens. To deal with their loan quality problems, banks
have been selling the riskier portions of their loan portfolios
Chart 4
Change in U.S. Industries’ Share-Weighted Nonperforming 










Sources: Shared National Credit Program data; authors’ calculations.
Notes: Each industry is represented by a circle whose size corresponds to that 
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 Utilities(Julavits and Boraks 2002).Moreover,loan volume,particu-
larly C&I lending,decreased during 2001.
This pullback in credit is also evident in the nonfinancial
commercial paper market,where volume has undergone a 
40 percent drop since the end of 2000 (Kwan 2002).Issuance
also declined for high-yield bonds,and speculative spreads
have risen.Through August of 2002,new high-yield issues
were down 31 percent by volume from the same period in
2001 (O’Leary 2002).Much of the decline in activity can be
traced to the telecom sector,which accounted for 70 percent
of the total value of bond defaults in the first half of 2002
(Schmelkin 2002).
While these facts indicate that a tightening of credit is
under way,economy-wide credit restrictions seem unlikely.
Total business debt has actually increased over the past two
years even as bank loan volume has decreased; nonbank
lenders have filled the gap left by traditional banks (Kwan
2002).In addition,the Federal Reserve’s Senior Loan Officer
Opinion Survey (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System 2002b) suggests that the greater part of the decline in
C&I loan volume for commercial banks is due to decreased
demand as the economy has weakened,rather than to tighter
credit standards and a decline in loan supply.This evidence
suggests that the reduction in credit is largely concentrated
in problem industries, where the tightening is a natural
result of borrowers’decreased ability to repay.
One final possible concern is that the large banks that lent
to these companies may have fewer loss-mitigating tools at
their disposal.Since many of these now-troubled loans were
to companies that were originally good credits (termed
“fallen angels”in the bond market),they were made without
strong collateral or protective covenants.As a result,banks
are likely to have difficulty collecting on the bad debt and
may face higher charge-offs in the future.
Conclusions
Our analysis of loan quality trends reveals significant differ-
ences between the recent deterioration in loan quality and the
decline that took place a decade ago.Most important,both the
level and the increase in loan quality problems were substan-
tially smaller in 2002 than during the banking crisis ofthe late
1980s and early 1990s.Moreover,the core of industry prob-
lems has shifted from real-estate-related lending in medium
and large banks to commercial and industrial lending in the
largest banks.The decline in credit quality is now more nar-
rowly confined to a small number of industries,particularly
the telecommunications industry.Of course,macroeconomic
conditions such as a “double-dip”recession,increased uncer-
tainty about national security and geopolitical events,global
weakness, and concerns over further corporate scandals
could lead to increased credit problems in the future,but the
current picture suggests relatively healthy loan quality.
These conclusions have several implications for the U.S.
banking industry and the economy.In 1991,for example,
some argued that a credit crunch exacerbated the economic
decline.The relative strength of loan quality at small banks
and the concentration of large banks’ loan problems in 
specific industries,however,suggest that a small-bank credit
crunch is less likely now.Some high-risk firms may experi-
ence difficulty in obtaining credit in any market,but this is a
normal result of well-functioning credit markets.
A second issue relates to bank profits.Because loan qual-
ity problems are an indicator of future banking profitability,
our results suggest that profitability may diverge across
banks.Bassett and Brady (2001) have shown that the return
on assets was comparable for large and small banks from
1985 to 2000.17 If the divergence in loan quality ratios docu-
mented here foreshadows profitability trends, it may be 
reasonable to expect small banks’profits to rise relative to
those of large banks in the near term.
As a final point,we emphasize that this study has focused
entirely on the credit risk associated with the quality of
on-balance-sheet lending and off-balance-sheet loan com-
mitments. This risk is, of course, only one component of
bank risk.As banks enter new business lines and offer new
products,they are facing new risks.We have not examined
trading,operational,or market risk,or compared the past and
present health of other bank activities.Thus,our main con-
clusion about the relative strength of the U.S.banking indus-
try in 2002 applies only to traditional lending activities.
Notes
1. The National Bureau of Economic Research has not yet assigned an ending
date to the recession that began in March 2001. For ease of reference in this
article, we term this recession the 2001-02 recession.
2. The NPL ratio is defined as nonperforming loans—nonaccrual loans plus
loans ninety days or more past due—as a percentage of total loans. Non-
accrual loans are those not earning the contractual rate of interest because the
full collection of principal is in doubt or because interest payments have not
been made. The NPL ratio is our primary indicator of loan quality problems.
3. The SNC Program is maintained jointly by the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. For more information about the 
program, see Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (2002a).
4. Note that the NPL ratio fell in fourth-quarter 2002, but this comparison
stops in third-quarter 2002. 
5. The 1980s and early 1990s marked a period of particularly severe loan 
quality problems because of extraordinary regulatory and competitive pres-
sures: for example, deregulation of interest rates and interstate banking, real
estate lending problems, disintermediation, the crisis in developing-country
loans, and oil price shocks. See FDIC (1997) for details.
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66. See Haltiwanger (1997) for details from manufacturing and Stiroh (2000)
for details from banking.
7. A technical appendix with the derivation and detailed estimates is available
at < http://www.newyorkfed.org/rmaghome/curr_iss/ci9-4.html>.
8. From first-quarter 1984 to fourth-quarter 1986, Call Report data include a
fourth category—“foreign office loans”; these cannot be consistently allocated
by loan type. C&I loans include the “all other loan” category because the Call
Reports do not break out the C&I nonperforming loans for small banks.
9. Small banks are defined as those with assets less than $500 million,
medium banks as those with assets between $500 million and $10 billion, and
large banks as those with assets greater than $10 billion. All figures are in 2002
dollars.
10. See Browne and Rosengren (1993).
11. Large banks held 47.2 percent of loans in second-quarter 1991 and 
69.8 percent in third-quarter 2002, while medium banks held 32.7 percent and
17.3 percent and small banks held 20.3 percent and 12.9 percent, respectively.
12. Details are in the technical appendix.
13. For the C&I contribution, we include only large and medium banks whose
C&I NPL ratios can be broken out.
14. The SNC Program’s review covers all loan commitments of at least $20 mil-
lion that are shared by three or more financial institutions (two or more prior to
1999). The data include information on the value of total loan commitments and
the amount drawn down (advanced). Included are commitments for commercial
real estate, commercial and industrial loans, and off-balance-sheet commit-
ments made by U.S. commercial banks. 
15. The correlation between the NPL ratio of large bank C&I loans and the
NPLC ratio from SNC for 1989 to 2002 is 0.91 in levels and 0.82 in growth rates.
We chose to include 10 percent of substandard loans in our definition of nonper-
forming loan commitments in order to reconcile the Call Report data with the
SNC data, but altering this percentage does not materially change the results. We
obtain essentially the same results whether we use the entire committed loan
amount or only the outstanding balances.
16. We use data for ninety-five three-digit NAICS industries (not shown) to
calculate the HHI in each year. More precisely, we create a ratio of the industry
contribution to total NPLCs, multiply by 100, square the ratio, and sum over all
industries. A higher HHI indicates a more concentrated distribution of loan
quality problems.
17. The return on equity of large banks, however, has generally exceeded that
for small banks because the large banks are typically more leveraged.
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